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Colombia’s PACES program provided over 125,000 pupils from poor neighborhoods with vouchers that
covered approximately half the cost of private secondary school. Vouchers were renewable annually based
on satisfactory performance.   Since many vouchers were allocated by lottery, we use differences in outcomes
between lottery winners and losers to assess program effects.  Three years into the program, lottery winners
were 15 percentage points more likely to have attended private school, had completed .1 more years of
schooling, and were about 10 percentage points more likely to have finished 8
th grade, primarily because they
were less likely to repeat grades.  The program did not significantly affect dropout rates.  Lottery winners
scored .2 standard deviations higher on standardized tests.  There is some evidence that winners worked less
than losers and were less likely to marry or cohabit as teenagers.  On average, lottery winners increased their
educational expenditure by about 70% of the value of the voucher. Since winners also worked less, they
devoted more total resources to education.  Compared to an equivalent expansion of the public education
system, the voucher program increased annual government educational expenditure by about $24 per winner.
But the costs to the government and to participants were probably much less than the increase in winners’
earnings due to greater educational attainment.
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Cambridge, MA 021381US studies in this mold include Green, Peterson, and Du (1996) and Rouse (1998), who evaluated a voucher lottery
in Milwaukee.  Rouse’s estimates, which control for attrition, show modest increases in math scores among voucher
recipients.  Other US studies include Howell et al (2000), Myers et al (2000) and Bettinger (2001a), who evaluate
various private scholarship programs.  Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) examine a large-scale voucher program in Chile
but do not take advantage of random assignment.  Bellow and King (1993) assess a smaller program in Bangladesh. 
The literature on public/private comparisons in the US is extensive.  Two recent studies are Evans and Schwab
(1995) and Neal (1997). Cox and Jimenez (1991) compare public and private schools in Colombia and Tanzania, and
Jimenez, Lockheed, and Paqueo (1991) summarize comparisons in five countries.  See also the Patrinos and
Ariasingham (1997) survey of demand-side financing in poor countries.  Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin (2000) and
Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2000) use randomization to examine other educational interventions in developing
 While the academic controversy over school providers and school vouchers has raged most intensely
in the US, private schools account for only about 11% of US enrollment (USDOE, 1998).  Moreover, over
half of American parents report that they are very satisfied with the public schools their children attend.  In
the developing world, in contrast, private enrollment as a proportion of total enrollment is 2-3 times higher
than in industrialized nations (James, 1993).  Problems with public schools are usually more severe in low-
income countries, since the quality and integrity of public-sector service-delivery is highly correlated with
income levels (Rauch and Evans, 2000).  In Indian schools, for example, a recent study found that one-third
of headmasters were absent at the time of the researchers' visit (PROBE Team, 1999), while in Kenya,
Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin (2000) found that teachers were absent 28% of the time.  The view that private
schools function better than public schools in the developing world has prompted calls for governments in
poor countries to experiment with demand-side financing programs such as vouchers (e.g, Psacharopolous,
Tan, and Jimenez, 1986).  
This paper presents evidence on the impact of one of the largest school voucher programs to date, the
Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria (PACES), a Colombian program which
provided over 125,000 pupils with vouchers covering somewhat more than half the cost of private secondary
school.  Vouchers could be renewed as long as students maintained satisfactory academic performance.  Since
many vouchers were awarded by lottery, we use a quasi-experimental research design comparing educational
and other outcomes of lottery winners and losers.  Subject to a variety of caveats, the resulting estimates
provide evidence on program effects on participants that are similar to those arising from a randomized trial.
As far as we know, ours is the first study of a private school voucher program in a developing country to take
advantage of randomized treatment.
1countries. 
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A survey of three applicant cohorts shows no significant differences between lottery winners and
losers in enrollment three years after application, with most pupils in both the winner and loser groups still
in school.  But lottery winners were 15 percentage points more likely to attend private schools rather than
public schools.  Moreover, lottery winners had completed an additional .1 years of school and were about 10
percentage points more likely than losers to have completed 8
th grade, primarily because they repeated fewer
grades.  Although high rates of grade repetition are a widely recognized problem in Latin America (see, e.g.,
Jacoby, 1994; and Psacharopoulos and Velez, 1993), reduced repetition need not indicate greater learning.
We therefore administered achievement tests to a subset of the pupils surveyed.  The test results suggest that,
on average, lottery winners scored about .2 standard deviations higher than losers, a large but only marginally
significant difference.  The effect on girls is larger and more precisely estimated than the effect on boys.
In addition to increased educational attainment and academic achievement, there is also some
evidence that the voucher program affected non-educational outcomes.  In particular, lottery winners were
less likely to be married or cohabiting and worked about 1.2 fewer hours per week (again, mostly a difference
for girls).  Both of these results suggest an increased focus on schooling among lottery winners.
While comparisons between winners and losers provide a simple strategy for assessing program
impact, our survey indicates that only about 90% of lottery winners had ever used the voucher or any other
type of scholarship, while 24% of losers received scholarships from other sources.  It therefore seems
reasonable to think of lottery win/loss status as an instrument for scholarship receipt in a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) set-up.  There is a strong first-stage here, though the relationship between voucher status and
scholarship use is not deterministic.  Instrumenting for scholarship use with lottery win/loss status suggests
that scholarship use generated effects on grade completion and test scores that are roughly 50% larger than
the reduced form effect of winning the lottery.
The last part of the paper presents a fiscal and cost-benefit analysis of the voucher program.  Most
lottery winners would have attended private school anyway, at least for a few years, and therefore reduced3
their educational expenditure in response to the program.  On the other hand, voucher winners who were
induced to switch from public to private schools greatly increased their educational expenditure, since the
voucher covered only about half the cost of private school.  On balance, winners’ gross school fees exceeded
those of losers by about 70% of the amount they received from the voucher.  Winners paid greater fees
because they were more likely to go to private schools, and because some winners who would have gone to
private schools anyway switched to more expensive private schools. Moreover, lottery winners worked less,
so that, on balance, households winning the lottery actually devoted more resources to education than the
voucher face value.  We also estimate that the voucher program cost the government about $24 more per
winner than the cost of creating a public school placement.  These costs to participants and the government
are likely to have been more than outweighed by the benefits of the voucher to participants -- in the form of
the economic return to increased educational attainment and test scores.
A number of channels could potentially account for the PACES program’s effects on participants.
The program clearly shifted some participants from public to private school, and pupils who shifted may have
benefitted from the opportunity to attend private schools.  There is also evidence that some pupils who would
have attended private school anyway were able to attend more expensive private schools.  Finally, voucher
recipients may have had greater incentives to focus on school because vouchers could only be renewed for
those pupils who did not repeat grades.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I provides background on education in Colombia and
describes the PACES program in more detail.  Section II discusses data and presents descriptive statistics from
our survey.  Section III discusses the effect of the program on school choice and basic educational outcomes.
Section IV reports the effect of winning a voucher on test scores and non-education outcomes.  Section V
discusses the use of lottery win/loss status as an instrument to identify the causal effect of receiving a
scholarship.  Finally, Section VI looks at the effect of the program on household and government expenditure,
and compares program costs with the benefits to participants. 2PACES was launched in November 1991 with advertisements in print and on radio soliciting applicants in
participating cities (Calderon, 1996). A World Bank (1993) report on Colombian secondary schools notes that most
schools operated 2 or 3 shifts and that some towns have little room for additional pupils in spite of projected
enrollment growth.  Other problems mentioned in the report include poor primary-school preparation, weak school
management, lack of teacher preparedness, lack of textbooks, and shortages of other supplemental materials.  The
early 1990s was a general period of reform and liberalization in Colombia; see, for example, Kugler (1999). 
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I. Background
The Colombian government established the PACES program in late 1991 as part of a wider
decentralization effort and in an attempt to expand private provision of public services (King et al, 1997).
The program, which was partly funded by the World Bank, was also motivated as an effort to quickly expand
school capacity and to raise secondary school enrollment rates (King, Orazem, and Wolgemuth, 1998).
2
Although 89% of Colombia’s primary-school age children were enrolled in 1993, only 75% of the eligible
population was enrolled in secondary schools.  Among children of eligible age in the poorest quintile of the
population, 78% were enrolled in primary school, but only 55% were enrolled in secondary school (Sanchez
and Mendez, 1995; note that secondary school covers grades 6-11 in Colombia.)
The PACES program targeted low-income families by offering vouchers only to children residing in
neighborhoods classified as falling into the two lowest socioeconomic strata (out of 6 possible strata). 
Applicants had to submit a utility bill to establish residential location and voucher eligibility.  Targeting was
enhanced by restricting vouchers to children who attended public primary schools. Almost  half of children
from the richest income quintile attended private primary schools.  Studies by Morales-Cobo (1993) and
Ribero and Tenjo (1997) suggests that the targeting was largely effective in Bogota. 
PACES vouchers were worth only about US$190 at the time of our survey.  The maximum voucher
value was set initially to correspond to the average tuition of low-to-middle cost private schools in Colombia’s
three largest cities.  Schools charging less than the vouchers’ face value received only their usual tuition.
PACES vouchers became less generous over time because they did not keep up with inflation, and hence
recipients had to supplement vouchers with additional payments to cover school fees.  Our survey data show
matriculation and monthly fees for private schools attended by voucher applicants in 1998 averaged about3Background information in this section is taken from King et al (1997), Calderon (1996), and unpublished ICETEX
documents.
4This was due largely to reported problems with low-quality for-profit schools created to exploit the vouchers. 
Calderon (1996) notes that even before the non-profit restriction was imposed, only 15% of Bogota’s voucher
students attended such institutions.
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$340, so most voucher recipients supplemented the voucher with private funds.  By way of comparison, the
average annual per-pupil public expenditure in Colombia’s public secondary school system in 1995 was just
over $350 (DNP, 1999), and public school parents in our sample typically paid tuition or fees of roughly $58.
Per capita GNP in Colombia is now around $2,280 (World Bank, 1999). 
To qualify for a voucher, applicants must have been entering the Colombian secondary school cycle
which begins with grade 6, and be aged 15 or under.  Prior to applying, students must already have been
admitted to a participating secondary school (i.e., one that would accept the voucher).
3  Participating schools
had to be located in participating towns, which included all of Colombia’s largest cities.  Just under half of
private schools in the 10 largest cities accepted vouchers in 1993.
Participating schools tended to serve lower-income pupils, and to have lower tuition than non-
participating private schools.  Schools with a vocational curriculum were also over-represented among those
in the program.  Participating private schools included for-profit schools, religious-affiliated schools, and
schools run by charitable foundations.  Initially, vouchers could be used at both for-profit and non-profit
schools, but after 1996, for-profit schools were excluded.
4  The number of vouchers in use in any one year
peaked at roughly 90,000 in 1994 and 1995.  There were approximately 3.1 million secondary school pupils
in Colombia in 1995, 37% of whom attended private schools.  In Bogota, roughly 58% of 567,000 secondary
school pupils attended private school.
Test score comparisons reported by King et al (1997) show achievement levels in participating private
schools were very close to those in public schools, though significantly below achievement levels in non-
participating private schools.  Pupil-teacher ratios and facilities were similar in public and participating private
schools, and many of the teachers in the private schools most likely to participate in the PACES program are6
moonlighting or retired public school teachers.  Non-participating private schools had lower pupil-teacher
ratios and better facilities.  Clearly, then, relatively elite private schools opted-out of the PACES program.
Reasons for this may include delays in payment of voucher funds to schools and bureaucracy in the
Colombian Institute for Education, Credit and Training Abroad (ICETEX), which ran the program.  Moreover,
vouchers were insufficient to cover much of the tuition at more expensive schools, and some school managers
probably viewed the prospect of an influx of pupils from low-income backgrounds as undesirable.  On the
other hand, many private schools in Colombia serving low-income populations apparently welcomed the
PACES program.
Voucher recipients were eligible for automatic renewal through eleventh grade, when Colombian high
school ends, provided the recipient’s academic performance warranted promotion to the next grade.  Students
failing a grade were supposed to be dropped from the PACES program.  Figures from Calderon (1996) show
that, on average, 77% of recipients renewed their vouchers, and estimates from our data are similar.  By way
of comparison, the national high school promotion rate was about 70%.  Students who transferred from one
participating private school to another could, in principle, transfer the voucher to the new school.  In practice,
however, our survey suggests many students who transferred schools after winning lost their vouchers.
Cities and towns used lotteries to allocate vouchers when demand exceeded supply.  Municipal
governments paid 20% of the voucher cost, while the central government paid 80%.  Each municipality
decided how many vouchers to fund, subject to a maximum allocated to towns by the central government.
This allocation was determined by estimating the shortfall between primary school enrollment and the
available space in public secondary schools.  Voucher award rates therefore varied considerably by city and
year, depending on the ratio of applicants to available vouchers.  Regional ICETEX offices worked with
individual municipalities to determine the number of vouchers to be funded, to check school requirements for
participation, and to monitor implementation of the program.  The Bogota ICETEX office provided software
and instructions to regional offices for the purposes of random selection of applicants in cases of over-5In a few cities, the local ICETEX office assigned vouchers based on pupils’ primary school performance instead of
randomly. 
6The data appendix in our working paper (Angrist et al, 2001) provides additional information about the survey.
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subscription.  We obtained copies of lists of lottery winners and losers from ICETEX offices.
5
II. The Applicant Survey
A. Descriptive Statistics
Beginning in the summer of 1998, we interviewed roughly 1,600 PACES applicants, stratifying to
obtain approximately equal numbers of winners and losers.  Interviewing was limited to the 1995 and 1997
applicant cohorts from Bogota and the 1993 applicant cohort from Jamundi, a suburb of Cali.  These years
and cities were chosen for a combination of scientific and practical reasons.  The largest and longest-running
voucher program was in Bogota, and our survey team is based there.  Cali is Colombia's second largest city
and therefore also important, but almost no Cali applicants reported phone numbers, so we concentrated on
a suburb, Jamundi.  Telephones were used for the majority of interviews, primarily to reduce costs, but also
because of interviewer safety and logistical considerations.  In principle, the lottery was random within
localities and conditional on whether households have access to a telephone (even if it is a neighbor’s phone),
the results should therefore yield internally valid estimates of the causal effect of the program on voucher
applicants with access to a telephone in surveyed cities.  Over 80% of applicants had access to a phone, and
in the Bogota 1995 cohort, 88% had access to a phone.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sampling frame, attempted contacts and completed
interviews.
6  There were 6,156 applicants in the three applicant cohorts of interest.  We attempted to interview
almost 3,000 applicants, obtaining an overall response rate of 54% and a response rate of almost 61% for the
1997 Bogota lottery.  The higher response rate in the most recent lottery is not surprising since contact
information for 1997 applicants is more recent.  Interviews were completed with 55% of lottery winners and
53% of lottery losers.  Although this response rate is far from ideal, the fact that winners and losers were7The vast majority of non-responders were people we could not reach by telephone, either because they had moved or
because the telephone number we had no longer worked.  Roughly 3% of families contacted refused to answer.  The
only significant difference in response rates by win/loss status is for the Jamundi cohort.  In what follows, we present
results for the Bogota 1995 cohort and the combined cohorts separately.  Complete follow-up is the holy grail of
education research.  Even careful evaluation studies using randomized and quasi-randomized designs (e.g., Rouse,
1998; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001) are based on samples with substantial loss to follow-up.  Similarly, Howell et al
(2000) report follow-up rates similar to ours for US voucher trials in three cities.
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almost equally likely to be interviewed is encouraging because the question of sample selection bias turns on
whether voucher status is correlated with response probabilities (see, e.g., Angrist, 1997).  Because response
probabilities are virtually uncorrelated with voucher status, there should be little bias from our failure to
interview all applicants.
7 
The typical applicant was about 13 years old at the time of application, while average age on the
survey date varied from 13 for 1997 applicants to 17 for 1993 applicants.  About half of the applicants were
male.  Roughly 85% of applicants were still in school, enrolled in grades ranging from 6th for the 1997 cohort
to 8th or 9th for the 1993 cohort.  Cohorts advance less than one grade per year because of repetition.  The
descriptive statistics also show that almost 90% of the applicants we interviewed started 6th grade in private
school. This reflects the fact that eligibility for PACES vouchers was conditional on admission to a
participating private school.  Thus, most lottery losers went to private school anyway, at least for one year.
On the other hand, only 63% of applicants were still in private school as of the survey date.
B. Personal Characteristics and Voucher Status
There is little evidence of any association between win/loss status and the individual characteristics
measured in our data from Bogota, although winners and losers are less comparable in the 1993 Jamundi
cohort.  This can be seen in Table 2, which reports means and differences by win/loss status for all applicants
in the study population, for sampled applicants, and for the sample of completed surveys.  The sampling
process began with lists showing applicant ID numbers, names, addresses, and phone numbers, separately for
winners and losers.  To obtain demographic characteristics for all applicants, whether surveyed or not, we
imputed applicant age using ID numbers (which incorporate birthdays).  We note, however, that our strategy8Neighborhoods in this case are large areas or districts.
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of imputing ages is subject to error since 13% of applicants have invalid ID numbers as determined by the ID
number control digit.  We excluded observations in which the applicant was younger than 9 or older than 25.
In practice, this restriction affected only two observations.  A second variable from the applicant record is
gender.  We used first names to assign sex for about 80% of the applicants.  A final variable from the
applicant record is a dummy for whether the record included a phone number. 
Winners and losers have similar telephone access, age, and sex mix in the 1995 and 1997 Bogota data.
As a further check on randomness, we compared win rates by school in those schools with more than 20
applicants to city averages in the Bogota data from 1995.  No school had a win rate that differed significantly
from the city average.  In the Jamundi-93 sample, however, there are significant differences in average age
and gender by win/loss status.  Because the differences between winners and losers in the Jamundi lottery may
indicate non-random assignment of vouchers, and because the 1997 Bogota cohort is too recent for a good
reading on some outcomes, we present results from the Bogota-95 sample separately from the results for the
pooled sample including all three cohorts.
III. Impact on Scholarship Use, School Choice, and Schooling
Our estimates of lottery effects are based on the following regression model:
yic = XiNβ0 + α0Zi + δc + εic,( 1 )
where yic is the dependent variable for child i from application cohort c (defined by city and year); Xi
represents a vector of individual and survey characteristics like age, sex, and whether the survey was
telephone or in-person; Zi is an indicator for whether child i won the voucher lottery; and δc is an applicant
cohort effect to control for the fact that the probability of winning varied by city and year.  The coefficient
of interest is α0.  We estimate (1) using three sets of control variables: “no controls”, i.e., excluding the Xi
variables; “basic controls” including the Xi variables; and “basic plus barrio controls” which includes the Xi
variables plus 19 neighborhood dummies in the Bogota-95 sample.
8    9We can convert the private-school enrollment effects  to an elasticity as follows.  PACES vouchers reduced the
marginal cost of private school attendance by about 50%, while vouchers increased private school enrollment in 7
th
grade by about 17%.  The implied elasticity of private enrollment with respect to marginal cost is therefore .34. 
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A.  Effects on Scholarship Use and School Choice
We begin with a simple analysis of the effect of winning the lottery on private school scholarship
receipt and the choice between public and private school.  The most immediate effect of the lottery was to
increase the likelihood of receiving a private school scholarship.  This can be seen in the first row of Table
3, which shows that at the time of our survey, voucher winners were 51 percentage points more likely than
losers to have been using some kind of scholarship (including non-PACES scholarships).  Not all winners
were using their PACES vouchers in the survey year.  This is because 15% of winners were not in school at
all, and another 16% were in public schools, and therefore ineligible for scholarships.  Some lottery winners
also lost their voucher after repeating a grade (7%), while 5% switched to non-participating private schools
or failed to complete the paperwork for a transfer.  Others attended schools that stopped accepting vouchers
or lost their vouchers for unreported reasons.  Just as not all winners were using a scholarship, some losers
obtained scholarships from programs other than PACES and one loser was awarded a PACES voucher after
re-applying the following year.
At the time of the survey, enrollment rates were .83 for losers and .85 for winners in the Bogota-95
sample, an insignificant difference.  The estimates in Table 3 also show that most PACES applicants entered
6
th grade in a private secondary school, and most finished 6
th grade whether or not they won a voucher.  But
lottery winners were 6-7 percentage points more likely than losers to have begun 6
th grade in private school,
and 15-16 percentage points more likely to be in private school at the time of our survey.   The effect of
winning the PACES lottery on the probability of private school attendance was even larger in 7
th grade,
probably because losers were more likely to have left private school by then.
These results suggest the decision between public and private school was sensitive to variation in the
price of private school induced by the program, while the decision whether to attend school was not.
9  This
is consistent with a model in which those households most willing and able to pay for education attend private10PACES subsidies were initially large enough to cover the entire cost of private school, and may have shifted
recipients from no school to private school when the program started.  However, the voucher value was later eroded
by inflation.
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school; a middle group attends public school; and those least willing or able to pay do not attend at all.  In this
case, no one is on the private school/no school margin, and so small subsidies to private education do not
directly increase overall enrollment.
10  However, since many public schools in Colombia were turning away
applicants due to overcrowding, PACES is likely to have opened up places in public school for other pupils
by reducing public-school queuing. 
B. Effects on Schooling
Lottery winners completed more schooling than losers, and were less likely to repeat grades.  For
example, lottery losers had completed 7.5 years of schooling at the time of our survey, but winners in the 1995
Bogota sample completed an additional .12-.16 years (.8 years in the full sample).  As noted earlier, there was
no statistically significant effect on enrollment.  The effect on years of schooling and the lack of an effect on
enrollment is primarily the result of a reduced probability of grade repetition for winners.  This is reflected
in a sharp increase in the likelihood lottery winners had finished 8
th grade as of the survey date, with a smaller
impact on 7
th grade completion.  In the Bogota-95 sample, over 20% of losers had repeated a grade since
beginning 6
th grade, and almost 20% repeated 6
th grade.  But the probability of grade repetition was reduced
by 5-6 percentage points for lottery winners.
The estimates of α0 change little as the list of control variables changes, a result to be expected since
the voucher lottery was random.  The estimation results are also similar in the Bogota-95 and full samples,
and are largely invariant to the inclusion of neighborhood effects.  Estimates and standard errors for the
Bogota 1995 sample also change little in models with school effects.  
Separate results by sex, reported in Table 4, show moderately larger effects on educational attainment
for girls, though the pattern of sex differences in the effects on private school enrollment are not clear cut. 
Results for the Bogota-95 sample show male lottery winners with an insignificant 0.12 more years of11There is little evidence that the effect of winning the voucher varied with applicants' socioeconomic strata of
residence or parents’ education.  However, estimates for subgroups are imprecise.
12 For example, Psacharopolous and Velez (1993) and Harbison and Hanushek (1992) use repetition rates as a
measure of school quality in Colombia and Brazil.
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schooling while female lottery winners obtained 0.14 years more of schooling, a statistically significant effect.
Differences by sex are more pronounced in the full sample, with an insignificant 0.06 more years of schooling
for boys, and a statistically significant 0.12 more years of schooling for girls.  It should also be noted that
while effects for boys are almost entirely due to grade repetition, the effects for girls appear to come from both
reduced grade repetition and additional time spent in school.
11 
The greater probability of 8
th grade completion and lower repetition rates for lottery winners seem like
desirable outcomes.  In fact, high rates of grade repetition in Latin America are widely seen as symptomatic
of poorly functioning public schools.
12  But the interpretation of these effects is complicated by the fact that
pupils who failed a grade were supposed to forfeit PACES vouchers.  Private schools may therefore have had
an incentive to promote pupils with vouchers even if their performance did not meet normal promotional
standards.  To explore this possibility, we look at effects on test scores and non-educational outcomes in the
next section.
IV.  Effects on Test Scores and Non-Education Outcomes
A. Effects on Test Scores
We tested children from the 1995 applicant cohort in three Bogota neighborhoods.  These
neighborhoods were chosen because they had relatively large numbers of winners and losers, and because of
the availability of suitable (and safe) testing sites.  The tests were administered in 1999, approximately one
year after our household survey and three years after the children applied for the program.   The test sample
was drawn from applicants for whom we had survey data.  Participants were solicited by telephone, followed
by hand delivery of letters describing the purpose of the test and inviting pupils to be tested.  Those who failed
to appear on the test day were invited again for a second testing, except at the last sitting.  To encourage13
participation, refreshments were provided at each site, and each test concluded with the raffle of a bicycle and
other prizes.  Pupils were also given 5 or 10 thousand pesos (US $3.23 or $6.45) to cover travel costs.  The
invitation letter noted the offer of refreshments, travel reimbursement, and raffle.  See the data appendix for
additional details on the testing.
Our evaluation used La Prueba de Realizacion, a grade-specific multiple-choice achievement test for
native Spanish speakers, published by Riverside.  We administered only the mathematics, reading, and writing
subtests, each taking about 30 minutes.  This test was chosen because Colombian educators participated in
test development and the test had been used previously in Colombia (Cole et al, 1993).  The appendix to our
working paper (Angrist et al, 2001) compares test results from the Hispanic-American test-norming
populations for grades 9 and 10 with the results from our test.  Colombian 9th graders in our sample scored
lower than American pupils in mathematics, but they had reading skills slightly better than American 10th
graders.  The average Colombian writing score was close to the average score for American 10th graders. 
The Test Sample
Of the 1,176 Bogota 1995 applicants surveyed, 473 were invited for testing.  Statistics for pupils
invited and tested appear in the last column of Table 1.  Of the 473 invited, 283 were tested, an overall
response rate of about 60%.  The test-response rate is about 5% higher for winners, but the difference in
response rates by voucher status is not statistically significant.  The personal characteristics of those tested
are generally similar to those of the full Bogota 95 sample.  Also encouraging is the fact that, conditional on
taking the test, there is little evidence of differences in personal characteristics between voucher winners and
losers. This comparison can be seen in the last column of Table 2.
Test results
Table 5 reports estimates of the effect of winning the voucher lottery on test scores.  Columns 1 and13The results in column 1 and 3 are from models that include site dummies only.  The results in columns 2 and 4 are
from models that include controls for age, sex, parents’ schooling, strata of residence, type of interview, and survey
form.
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2 of Table 5 show results from models with and without covariates.
13  Columns 3 and 4 present the results of
estimating a single voucher coefficient for stacked subject results, in models with a pupil random effect.  That
is, we estimated:
yis = XiNβ0 + α0Zi + δi + εis,( 2 )
where yis is pupil i’s score in subject s, and δi is a random effect used to adjust standard errors for the fact that
there is likely to be within-pupil correlation across subjects.  Note that test score results are reported in
standard deviation units.
Lottery winners scored just over .2 standard deviations more than lottery losers, though this difference
is (not surprisingly, given the small test sample) only marginally significant.  According to US norms for La
Prueba, 2/10 of a standard deviation is roughly the score gain associated with one additional school year (Cole
et al, 1993).  This effect should probably therefore be seen as large, since subjects were tested three years after
applying to the program.  Lottery winners also scored higher on all subtests, though the only significant
difference is for reading scores (t=1.8).  The results for the stacked subjects, reported in columns 3 and 4, also
show marginally significantly higher scores for lottery winners, with the largest effects for models that stack
math and reading scores only.
Models estimated separately for boys and girls generate larger and more precise effects for girls than
boys.  For example, the estimated effect on total points for girls, reported in column 2 of Panel B for models
with covariates, is .26 (s.e.=.13).  The corresponding estimate for boys, reported in Panel C, is .17 (s.e.=.19).
The finding of a stronger effect on girls echoes some of the survey results.
Earlier we noted that reduced grade repetition among lottery winners could theoretically  have been
caused by a reduction in promotion standards for lottery winners, as well as by increased learning or a change
in school quality.  Comparing the test scores of winners and losers who were promoted provides  evidence
that the grade repetition results are not due solely to schools' lowering the bar for promotion of winners.  If14Suppose schools promote if a random variable x, representing the school’s internal assessment of the student, is
greater than a cutoff c, which takes on two values, cW for winners and cL for losers.  Suppose cW < cL, but test scores,
T, and the variable x are unaffected by winning the lottery.  Then the expected test score for lottery losers who are
promoted is E(T| x > cL).  The expected score for winners will be a weighted average of this and E(T| cW < x < cL). 
Average scores for promoted losers will therefore exceed average scores for promoted winners as long as E(T| x) is
increasing in x.
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the program itself did not affect achievement, but did lead schools to relax promotions standards for winners,
then average test scores for lottery winners who were promoted should be lower than average test scores for
lottery losers who were promoted.
14  In fact, the composite test scores of winners who were promoted are
about .14 standard deviations greater than the scores of promoted losers, although the difference is not
significant. 
Another possible channel through which the program could have reduced grade repetition is increased
effort by voucher recipients in order to avoid failing a grade and losing their vouchers.  In this scenario, the
program would have been just as successful if it had made payment to students conditional on satisfactory
academic performance, with no element of school choice.  This would imply that the primary incentive effect
should be on those who are near the margin for passing on to the next grade.  However, quantile regression
estimates (not reported here) suggest that the increase in test scores is not confined to low quantiles of the test
score distribution.  For reading and writing, there is no strong pattern of differential effects across quantiles,
while for math, the effects are, if anything, larger at the top of the distribution.  Standard errors for these
estimate are, of course, large, given the small sample.
B. Other Outcomes
Table 6 reports estimates of the effect of winning the lottery on non-educational outcomes.
Approximately 1.6% of lottery losers from Bogota were married or living with a companion, a low proportion
consistent with the fact that the average age of survey respondents was about 15.  Since this outcome is rare,
we estimated probit models as well as linear probability models.  
Both probit marginal effects and OLS estimates suggest that marriage and cohabitation were reduced16
for lottery winners, a marginally significant effect.  There is some evidence from the pooled sample that
lottery winners were less likely to be working than losers, with the largest effects in Bogota.  There is also
a significant difference in hours worked.  In particular, lottery winners worked 1.2 fewer hours per week than
losers.  This effect is larger and more precisely estimated for girls.  The reduction in work may be due to
income effects for the household, the greater time demands of private school relative to public school, or
increased incentives for lottery winners to spend time studying so as to avoid failing a grade and losing the
PACES voucher. 
V.  Instrumental Variables Estimates of Scholarship Effects
The analysis so far focuses on reduced form effects of winning the lottery.  In the discussion of Table
3, however, we noted that some lottery losers were awarded other scholarships, while some winners failed
to use or retain their PACES scholarships.  This section reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of ever receiving
any scholarship using voucher win/loss status as an instrumental variable (IV).  While only 6% of lottery
losers used a scholarship at the time of the survey, 24% had used a scholarship at some point.  In contrast,
90% of winners used a scholarship at some time.  The 2SLS estimates based on this difference are necessarily
larger than the reduced form effects of winning the lottery since winning the lottery is only imperfectly
correlated with receiving a scholarship.
The assumption that a scholarship use dummy satisfies an exclusion restriction in an instrumental
variables (IV) setup motivates 2SLS estimation of the equation:
yi = XiNβ1 + α1si + ξi,( 3 )
where si is a dummy for scholarship use, and Xi is the vector of “basic controls” used in previous tables.  The
associated first-stage relationship using Zi as an instrument is
si = XiNγ + πZi + ηi,( 4 )
The estimate of π is about .66 (s.e.=.021), so the second-stage estimates can be expected to be about 50%
larger than the corresponding reduced form estimates.  The interpretation of α1 in this case is as an15At first blush, private school attendance might appear to be the appropriate endogenous regressor for a 2SLS setup. 
But this seems unlikely to satisfy the required exclusion restriction since increased effort and increased school
quality probably also mediate the effects of the voucher.  Consistent with this, in practice, 2SLS estimates treating
private school attendance as an endogenous regressor generate estimates that are implausibly large.
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approximate effect of treatment on the subset of scholarship users who would not have used a scholarship
without PACES (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
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The 2SLS estimate of the effect of scholarship use on highest grade completed is about .2 in the
Bogota-95 sample and .13 in the full sample.  These estimates are reported in Table 7.  2SLS estimates of
voucher effects on the probability of finishing eighth grade are 13-15 percentage points, nearly a 25% increase
in completion rates.  This seems to be in the ballpark of Dynarski’s (2001) estimated completion elasticities
with respect to US financial aid for college students, though obviously not directly comparable.  Another
interesting result is the 2SLS estimate of the effect on test scores, .29, somewhat smaller than the
corresponding OLS estimate.  The 2SLS estimates are likely to be more useful for predicting the impact of
scholarship programs on new scholarship recipients than are the reduced form effects, which are diluted by
take-up rates less than one and the availability of alternative financing.
VI. Impact on Household and Government Expenditure
This section discusses the impact of the program on household and government budgets.  We begin
by showing that approximately 70% of voucher funds flowed to increased education expenditures, with the
remainder going to educational spending that households would have made without the voucher.  Taking into
account the reduction in work by lottery winners suggests that winning the lottery induced households to
devote more net resources to education.  The higher fees paid by voucher winners are due primarily to
winners’ greater likelihood of attending private school.  However, there is also some evidence that applicants
who would have attended private schools anyway traded up to more expensive private schools in response
to winning the voucher.  Since the voucher did not reduce the cost of private school at the margin, this result
weighs against the simplest models of education as human capital investment without credit constraints.  The16The estimated displacement of private expenditure is even lower when a more comprehensive expenditure measure
is used. Lottery winners report an estimated $84 more in comprehensive scholarship assistance (i.e., including
expenditure on uniforms and textbooks) and an extra $74 more in comprehensive educational expenditure. 
17Conditional on working, the average daily wage in our sample is $5.71.  We estimate the hourly wage assuming a 7-
hour work day.
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results in section B suggest that it cost the government about $24 more per lottery winner to provide school
places through PACES than through the public system.  Finally, section C aggregates the impact on
households, schools, and the government budget, arguing that the total social costs of providing additional
school places through the PACES voucher system were small, and therefore dwarfed by the benefits of the
program to participants.  The analysis in this section uses data for the 1995 Bogota applicant cohort only. 
A. Impact on Household Educational Expenditure
Three years after the 1995 lottery in Bogota, about 55% of winners and 5% of losers were still
receiving scholarships (a result from Table 3 repeated in the first row of Table 8 for the sample of
observations with usable fee data).  In this sample, 53% of losers were still in private school in the survey
year, with the private school enrollment rate 15.2% higher for winners after control for covariates.
Among applicants to the Bogota 95 lottery, winners received an average of $74 more in scholarship
aid than losers, result reported in the fourth row of Table 8.  Conditional on receiving a scholarship,
scholarship amounts were similar for winners and losers, at roughly $200.  The estimates in Table 8 also show
gross matriculation and tuition fees were $52 greater for lottery winners than losers.  Thus, the 1998 voucher
expenditures of $74 per winner caused an increase of $52 in gross fees for winners, about 70% of the extra
amount received by winners on average.  The remaining $22 of voucher funds presumably increased non-
educational expenditures by lottery winners.
16  
Aside from paying for school fees, households bear the opportunity cost of the effort students devote
to education.  The estimates for non-educational outcomes in Table 6 suggest lottery winners spent 1.2 fewer
hours working each week.  According to our survey data, the average hourly wage was 71 cents.
17  Assuming18To see this, note that if education is pure human capital investment, people choose schools so that a school costing
one dollar more generates exactly one more dollar of present discounted earnings. For people who would in any case
have attended a school costing more than $190, the voucher does not affect this first order condition.
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that students work 48 weeks per year, this reduction corresponds to an opportunity cost of 1.2 x $.71 x 48
weeks, approximately $41.  Combining the increase of $52 in expenditures on fees and the $41 of lost
earnings, we estimate that PACES lottery winners devoted $93 more to education than losers in the survey
year, or 126% of the $74 in extra scholarship assistance they received.  
Disaggregating Effects on Fees 
While winning households spent about $52 more on school fees, on average, this average conceals
important heterogeneity.  Since vouchers covered only part of the cost of private school, families with children
who were induced to switch to private school increased their educational expenditure sharply.  However, most
of the applicants who lost the lottery started private school in 6
th grade anyway, and over half were still in
private school in the survey year.  So most vouchers were received by applicants who would have attended
private school without the vouchers.  
Simple models of education as human capital investment with perfect credit markets suggest that since
PACES vouchers were worth only $190 per year, while most private schools cost over $300 per year, vouchers
were infra-marginal.  In other words, vouchers were not large enough to have caused households to increase
educational spending by choosing a more expensive private school.
18 On the other hand, winning the voucher
could have led households to choose more expensive private schools if educational spending is limited by
credit constraints or if education has consumption value as well as investment value.
In a non-causal, purely accounting sense, the $52 of increased expenditure by winners on school fees
can be decomposed into the effects of increased private school enrollment, and a switch to more expensive
private schools by winners.  Let Z be a dummy for lottery win/loss status as before, except we now drop “i”
subscripts to simplify notation.  Also, let R denote type of school attended (1 for private, 0 for public) and let
F denote education expenditure.  Gross school fees conditional on lottery win/loss status (i.e, fees paid by19Without simplification the comparison is
E[F| Z=1]-E[F| Z=0] 
= P[R=1| Z=0]{E[F| Z=1, R=1]-E[F| Z=0, R=1]} + E[F| Z=1, R=1]{P[R=1| Z=1]-P[R=1| Z=0]}
+ P[R=0| Z=0]{E[F| Z=1, R=0]-E[F| Z=0, R=0]} + E[F| Z=1, R=0]{P[R=0| Z=1]-P[R=0| Z=0]}.
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pupils without subtracting voucher amounts) are equal to
E[F| Z] = E[F| Z, R=1]P[R=1| Z] + E[F| Z, R=0]P[R=0| Z].
The overall change in fees is a linear combination of changes in public/private enrollment and changes in fees
charged by school type.  We can simplify the fee contrast between winners and losers using the fact that public
school fees changed little and overall school enrollment was also affected little, so that P[R=1| Z=1]-P[R=1|
Z=0] .-{P[R=0| Z=1]-P[R=0| Z=0]}.  Then we have the accounting relationship:
E[F| Z=1]-E[F| Z=0] 
= {E[F| Z=1, R=1]-E[F| Z=1, R=0]}{P[R=1| Z=1]-P[R=1| Z=0]}
+ P[R=1| Z=0]{E[F| Z=1, R=1]-E[F| Z=0, R=1]}. (5)
In words, the overall fee increase is caused by the private-public fee difference for winners, times private-
school enrollment effects of the program, plus the win/loss contrast in fees for private-school pupils.
19  The
right hand side components of (5) are as follows:
P[R=1| Z=1]-P[R=1| Z=0] = .15
E[F| Z=1, R=1]-E[F| Z=1, R=0] = 343-58=285
E[F| Z=1, R=1]-E[F| Z=0, R=1] = 11
P[R=1| Z=0] = .53.
This implies a total effect of $49, which is less than $52 because of the approximation used to simplify (5),
with $43 due to school switching.  Thus, in an accounting sense, the bulk of the change in household
expenditure can be attributed to increased private school enrollment.  However, for reasons discussed below,
this decomposition provides an incomplete picture of the causal effect of the program on the fee distribution.
Causal effects on fees for families who would have sent their children to private school anyway are
difficult to measure since we do not know who these families are.  Simply comparing fees by win/loss status20This is easy to show in a model where f1=h(f0) for any increasing transformation. More generally, winners who
attend private school only if they win probably attend cheaper private schools than those who attend regardless in a
variety of plausible models.  Suppose, for example, that school quality complements ability and higher quality
schools are more expensive.  Then low-ability children attend public schools if they lose the lottery and attend cheap
private schools if they win the lottery, while high-ability children attend expensive private schools whether or not
they win a voucher. Alternatively, consider a model with credit constraints in which the poor attend public school;
the rich attend private school; and the very rich attend expensive private schools.  Then lottery winners who would
have attended public school if they lost the lottery will attend cheaper schools than lottery winners who would have
attended private school even if they lost.
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conditional on private school attendance (the second term in (5), above) leads to a biased estimate that is
almost certainly too low.  To see this, let F0  be the public or private fee a pupil would pay if he or she loses
the lottery and let F1 be the public or private fee he or she would pay if he or she wins, and let R0 and R1
denote private school attendance if a pupil loses or wins the lottery respectively. Similarly, let f0 be the private
school fee a pupil would pay if he or she loses the lottery and let f1 be the private school fee a pupil would
pay if he or she wins.  Thus f0 = F0×R0  and f1 = F1×R1.  We imagine that these variables are defined for every
pupil, though in practice, we can only observe F0 , R0, and f0 for losers and F1, R1, and f1 for winners.  E[f1 -
f0| f0>0] is the effect on fees for those who would attend private school even if they were to lose the lottery.
The observed contrast in fees for private school pupils can be written as follows
E[F| Z=1, R=1]-E[F| Z=0, R=1] = E[f1 - f0| f0>0] + {E[f1| f1>0] - E[f1| f0>0]} (6)
The term in curly brackets comes from selection bias in the conditional-on-positive contrast.  Under mild
assumptions, this term is negative.
20  Assuming, as seems likely, that f1$f0, the left hand side therefore is a
lower bound on the causal effect, E[f1 - f0| f0>0].
The parameter E[f1 - f0| f0>0] is not identified without further assumptions (see, e.g., Chamberlain,
1986), though the previous discussion suggests we can treat the observed contrast in fees for private school
students as a lower bound.  Under mild assumptions, we can obtain a reasonably tight upper bound on this
and a related family of parameters: E[f1 - f0| f0>m0(θ)] where m0(θ) is the θ-quantile of the losers’ fee
distribution. By choosing m0(θ)=0, we bound E[f1 - f0| f0>0], while picking points at higher quantiles, we
measure the effect on those who would have spent more on private schooling in the absence of the lottery.
For example, we can bound the effect of winning the lottery on private school fees for those who would have22
spent more than the voucher amount ($190) on private school fees in the absence of the lottery.  This result
is stated formally below: 
Proposition.  Suppose that F1 $ F0.  Let m0(θ) be the θ quantile of the distribution F for losers, with m1(θ)
defined similarly for winners. Then 
E[f1-f0| f0>m0(θ)] #{E[F| Z=1, F>m1(θ)] - E[F| Z=0, F>m0(θ)]}/P[R=1| Z=0, F>m0(θ)]. (6)
Proof.  Define FM = F01(F0 # m0(θ)) + F01(F0 >m0(θ), R0=0) + F11(F0 >m0(θ), R0=1).  Note that FM = F1 for
households above the quantile who would have attended private schools anyway.  Otherwise, FM = F0.  So F1
$ FM $ F0. Let  pθ = P[R0=1| F0>m0(θ)]. Then 
E[FM  | F0 > m0(θ)] - E[F0 | F0 >m0(θ)] 
= {pθE[F1 | F0 > m0(θ), R0=1] + (1 - pθ)E[F0 | F0 > m0(θ), R0=0]} - E[F0 | F0 > m0(θ)].  
Note that 
E[F0 | F0 > m0(θ)] = pθE[F0 | F0 > m0(θ), R0=1] + (1 - pθ)E[F0 | F0 > m0(θ), R0=0].
Therefore, 
E[FM  | F0 > m0(θ)] - E[F0 | F0 >m0(θ)] = pθE[F1 - F0 | F0 > m0(θ), R0=1].
Since f0=R0F0, this implies
{E[FM  | F0 > m0(θ)] - E[F0 | F0 >m0(θ)}/ pθ = E[f1-f0 | f0> m0(θ)], 
which is the quantity we seek to bound.  Also, since F1$FM$F0 for all applicants, E[F1 | F1 > m1(θ)] $ E[F1 |
F0 > m0(θ)] $ E[FM  | F0 > m0(θ)], and we have
E[F1  | F1 > m1(θ)] - E[F0 | F0 > m0(θ)] $ E[FM  | F0 > m0(θ)] - E[F0 | F0 > m0(θ)].  
By randomization, E[F1  | F1 > m1(θ)] = E[F| Z=1, F>m1(θ)]  and E[F0 | F0 > m0(θ)] = E[F| Z=0, F>m0(θ)] and
pθ = P[R=1| Z=0, F>m0(θ)], which implies (6) and completes the proof. 
To see why the upper bound works in the case where θ=0, note that E(FM-F0) is the average difference
between winners’ and losers’ fees due to households who would have attended private schools in any case
trading up to more expensive private schools.  This is less than the observed difference in total fee payments
by win/loss status, E(F1-F0).  The econometric intuition for this result is that in parametric sample selection
models, controlling for the probability of sample selection eliminates selection bias.  Comparing winners and23
losers at the same quantiles equalizes the “probability of selection”  if F1 = h(F0) for some monotone
increasing transformation, h().  In fact, with no public school fees, the bound is exact when F1 = h(F0).  More
generally, dividing by P[R=1| Z=0, F>m0(θ)] corrects for the fact that some of those with positive fees were
attending public school, and the bound applies even without a deterministic link between F0 and F1.   
Estimates of (6) are reported in Table 9, along with a lower bound using the biased comparison for
quantiles analogous to (6), i.e., E[F| Z=1,R=1]F>m0(θ)]-E[F| Z=0,R=1]F>m0(θ)].  As noted earlier, this is a
plausible lower bound because of negative selection bias.  Note also that any reasonable behavioral model
would predict that a family that spent less than the voucher amount on private school without a voucher would
spend more after the voucher.  We therefore focus on bounding effects that are conditional on paying pre-
voucher fees equal to at least the voucher amount, roughly $190.
Among losers paying at least $190 in fees, the average fee was $371.  Almost all of these pupils were
in private school (in fact, some reports of public school fees above $190 are probably in error; others refer
to a handful of elite public schools that charge significant fees).  The lower bound on E[f1-f0| f0>190] is about
$3, but the upper bound is $38.  The voucher amount of $190 is the .52 quantile of the fee distribution.  Above
this amount, the bounds are tighter.  The estimated upper bounds above .6 range from  $31 to $48, while the
lower bounds range from $9 to $28.  The lower bound estimates are not significantly different from zero at
the 5% level.  In some cases, however,  the lower bounds are close to a 10% significance level, while the
upper bounds allow for effects on the order of 10% of fee costs and 20% of the voucher value.  Thus, it seems
likely that winners in the upper half of the fee distribution spent 5-10% more on private schools than they
otherwise would have.  This implies that the marginal propensity to spend voucher income on more expensive
private schools was non-trivial, counter to a simple model of human capital investment without credit
constraints.
Price discrimination by private schools
Another potential source of increased expenditure on fees by winners is price discrimination.  There24
is little evidence that private schools discriminated by charging more to applicants with PACES scholarships.
The easiest way for schools to price discriminate was to offer scholarships to those less likely to be able to
afford education at the full price, i.e., applicants without PACES vouchers.  In practice, however, we found
little evidence of price discrimination.  Our survey indicates that roughly 6% of losers in private school
received a school scholarship, while 3% of winners in private school received a school scholarship.   This is
a small and insignificant difference.  Per lottery winner, i.e., without conditioning on attending private school,
the difference is only about 1%.
B. Impact on the Government Budget
The PACES program was established in part to expand secondary school enrollment without using
the public system.  We estimate that the program increased public educational expenditure by about $24 per
lottery winner, relative to the cost of accommodating these pupils in public school.  As discussed in Section
III, winners were no more likely than losers to attend school, but the program probably did expand overall
school enrollment by freeing up places in public schools as lottery winners transferred to private schools. 
To see where the $24 figure comes from, note that the probability of attending public school, reported
in Table 8, fell by 0.14 for lottery winners.  The average per-pupil cost of a public secondary school slot was
about $350, excluding implicit rental for school facilities.  In the short run, the marginal cost of public school
slots may differ from the average cost, but in the long run, it seems reasonable to assume marginal and average
costs will be similar.  Assuming the marginal cost of providing public school places equals the average cost,
adding school spaces through PACES reduced long-run expenditure on public schools by 14% of $350 or
roughly $50 per winner, so the extra public educational expenditure per lottery winner is about $74 (to pupils)
- $50 (in reduced public school costs)  = $24.
   Moreover, allowing the marginal cost to differ from average
cost by $100 either way still leads to voucher program costs in the 10-40 dollar range.25
C. Overall Cost and Benefits
The extra society-wide educational resource cost per lottery winner differs from  the roughly $24 of
extra public education expenditure, since households used part of the voucher funds to offset education costs
they would have incurred privately, and households lost income from their children’s work. The average
lottery winner received $74 more than the average loser in scholarship assistance, but spent only $52 more
on gross school fees.   Lottery winners earned $41 less than losers through work.  Winning households’ net
resource contribution was therefore $52 (additional  school fees) + $41 (reduced earnings) - $74 (voucher)
= $19.  This implies that the society-wide additional educational resource cost per lottery winner was
approximately $24 (government)  + $19 (households) = $43.
The comparison of costs and benefits should take account of the fact that three years of costs were
incurred prior to our survey.  The total cost of the program can therefore be estimated by multiplying the
annual resource cost times the roughly 3 years winners received vouchers, for a total of about 3×24 = $72 in
additional public educational expenditure and 3×$43=$129 in total societal resource cost.  Actual costs are
probably somewhat higher, however, since voucher take-up rates declined over time, with 88% of winners
having ever used a voucher, and only 49% using it in the survey year.  Multiplying costs by 88%/49% for the
first and second years yields an upper bound on the three-year cost of the program of about $195 using the
$43/year figure for social costs.
These costs are very likely small relative to the benefits for participants.  Although lottery winners
gave up current earnings, they completed an additional .12 to .16 grades and scored approximately .2 standard
deviations higher on tests.  Among US Hispanic students who took the same test, the difference in test scores
between 7
th and 8
th graders, or between 8
th and 9
th graders, was also about .2 standard deviations, so the
achievement gain from winning the lottery may be as large as that associated with a full year of schooling.
Our estimates using a recent Colombian labor force survey show returns to schooling of about 10%.  If the
gain from the program is only the economic return to an additional 0.12 years of schooling, the program raised
winners’ wages by 1.2% per year, whereas if it is equal to that from a full year of schooling it raised wages26
by 10%.  Annual earnings of parents in our sample were about $2,400 per worker, and PACES applicants
should be able to earn more, since the average parent had only 5.9 years of education while the average
applicant had already completed 7.5 years and was still in school at the time of our survey.  We therefore
assume the expected earnings of applicants are $3000.  Thus, PACES seems very likely to raise lottery
winners’ wages by $36 per year, and might raise wages by as much as $300 per year if higher test scores have
a grade-equivalent payoff.  Discounted over applicants working lives, these benefits easily outweigh the social
costs of the voucher program, which are probably no more than $195.
A more complete cost-benefit analysis would take into account the program’s effects on non-
participants.  Pupils left behind in public schools may have been hurt by the departure of motivated classmates
for private schools, as argued by Hsieh and Urqiola (2001),  or alternatively, public schools may have
responded positively to increased competition, a possibility considered by Hoxby (2000) and Bettinger
(2001b).  Such general equilibrium effects cannot be assessed by comparing lottery winners and losers.  But
since the partial equilibrium cost-benefit analysis is clear-cut, and since only 15% of winners moved from
public to private schools, any negative external effects on non-participants would have to have been
extraordinarily large to outweigh program benefits.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
Governments in many developing countries are increasingly willing to experiment with demand-side
subsidies and public-private partnerships to meet basic education needs.  The impact of these programs and
policy innovations is an open question.  Colombia’s PACES program provides an unusual opportunity to
assess the effect of demand-side education financing in a Latin American country where private schools
educate a substantial fraction of pupils.  The PACES program is of special interest because many vouchers
were assigned by lottery, so program effects can be reliably assessed.  Our results suggest that lottery winners
benefitted from higher educational attainment, primarily as a consequence of reduced grade repetition, as well
as from higher test scores and a lower probability of teen cohabitation or employment.  Our estimates of the27
economic benefits to participants far exceed the estimated costs.  Most of the results suggest PACES vouchers
had a stronger effect on the education of girls than on the education of boys.  
Our findings suggest that demand-side programs like PACES can be a cost-effective way to increase
educational attainment and academic achievement, at least in countries like Colombia with a weak public
school infrastructure and a well-developed private education sector.  A number of channels could account for
the impact of PACES vouchers.  First, lottery winners were more likely to have attended participating private
schools, and these schools may be better than public schools.  Second, vouchers allowed some pupils who
would have attended private schools anyway to attend more expensive schools.  Finally, because voucher
recipients who failed a grade risked losing vouchers, lottery winners had an incentive to devote more effort
to school.  The net effect is such that the benefit of voucher awards were more than enough to offset the costs.
In work in progress, we are assessing longer term consequences of voucher receipt.  Preliminary results
indicate that the program increased secondary school completion rates, and that college-entrance test scores
were higher for lottery winners than losers.  These results also show test score increases in the upper tail of
the test score distribution, suggesting the effects reflect greater learning by high-achieving pupils and are not
due solely to greater incentives for PACES recipients to avoid grade repetition.28
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B. Attempted Interviews 
       









% Awarded Vouchers 
 
50.0 51.6 50.2  50.3  53.9 
Response Rate 
 
.523 .606 .591  .542  .598 
Winner Rate 
 
.528 .619 .650  .553  .624 










C. Completed Interviews 
       






     1618  283 













      .120 
 
.093 










      12.6 
      (1.4) 
12.6 
(1.2) 
Age on Survey Date 







      14.9 
      (1.7) 
15.6 
(1.2) 
Male .510  .495  .424  .499  .511 
Started 6
th in Private  .910  .880  .669  .880  .832 
Started 7
th in Private  .763  .731  .626  .744  .731 
Currently in Private 
School 













Currently In School  .836  .957  .778  .851  .841 
Notes: Standard Deviations for non-binary variables are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes may differ 
across rows.  Data are from 1998 household surveys.  "Age at time of Application" is imputed from the 
National Identification number reported on the application. 
 
  
Table 2. Personal Characteristics and Voucher Status 






































A. Data from PACES Application 
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 --  -- 
N 1519  3661    256  1736  166  334  1941  5731    --  -- 
 
B. Data for All Attempted 
Contacts 
               
 Has Phone 
 




 --  -- 
 Age at time of 

















 --  -- 










 --  -- 
  N  1035  2067    212  448  135  272  1382  2787    --  -- 
 
C. Survey Data 
                  






















 Male   .501  .004 
(.029) 



























































































































N  583  1176    131 277  74  165  788 1618    124 283 
Notes: The table reports voucher losers’ means and the estimated effect of winning a voucher.  Numbers in parentheses are 
standard deviations in columns of means and standard errors in columns of estimated voucher effects.  Models used for the 
estimates in Panels A and B include control for city and year of application; those for Panel C add controls for type of 
survey and instrument, neighborhood of residence, and month of interview.  Sample size varies by row.  The maximum 
sample size is shown in each panel.  The sample for the outcome “Age at time of Application” is restricted to applicants 9-
25 years old.  
Table 3. Educational Outcomes and Voucher Status 




































Using any Scholarship 































































































































































































Sample Size  562  1147    1577 
Notes: The table reports voucher losers’ means and the estimated effect of winning a voucher.  Numbers in 
parentheses are standard deviations in the column of means and standard errors in columns of estimated 
voucher effects.  The samples used to estimate 7
th and 8
th grade completion effects exclude Bogota 1997.  
The sample size for these outcomes is 1304 in columns 5-6.  The regression estimates are from models that 
include controls for city, year of application, whether applicant has phone, age, type of survey and 
instrument, strata of residence, and month of interview.  
 Table 4. Educational Outcomes and Voucher Status, By Gender 
Dependent Variable  Coefficient on Voucher Status 
  Bogota 1995    Combined Sample 
 Male    Female    Male  Female 


















































































































































































































Calendar Years in 

















Sample Size  280  575  282  572    779    798 
Notes:  The table reports voucher losers’ means and the estimated effect of winning a voucher.  
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations in columns of means and standard errors in columns of 
estimated voucher effects.  The regression estimates are from models that include controls for city, 
year of application, whether applicant has phone, age, type of survey and instrument, strata of 
residence, and month of interview. 
  


















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
A.  Test Scores for All Applicants         




   282 




   282 




   283 




   283 










B.  Test Scores for Female Applicants         




   146 




   146 




   147 





C.  Test Scores for Male Applicants         




   134 




   134 




   134 





Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Standard errors in Columns 1 and 2 are 
corrected for within-school-of-application clustering.  Test scores are in standard deviation units.  The 
estimates in columns 2 & 4 are from models that include controls for applicant’s age, gender, parents’ 
schooling, strata of residence and type of survey and instrument.  Columns 3 & 4 models include 
random effects for each test subject. The sample for "Pooled Test Scores" includes 3 observations per 
student (one for each subject) while "Math and Reading Scores" includes two observations per student.    
 
Table 6. Non-Educational Outcomes and Voucher Status 
Coefficient on Voucher Status  Dependent Variable 
Bogota 95    Combined Sample 
























A. Male and Female          






















































Sample Size  562  1147  1147    760  1577  1577 
           
B. Male           










































Sample  Size  280 575 575    373 779 778 
           
C. Female           
























































Sample  Size  282 572 572    388 798 798 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations in columns of means and standard errors in 
columns of estimated voucher effects.  Results are for samples with non-missing non-educational and 
educational outcomes.  Columns 2 and 3 show results from models that control for whether applicants 
had access to a phone, age, gender, type of survey and instrument, strata of residence, and month of 
interview.  Columns 5 and 6 also include controls for city and year of application.  
Table 7. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Ever Using a Private School Scholarship 
Coefficient on Ever Used a Private School Scholarship  Dependent Variable 
Bogota 95    Combined Sample 
   Loser 
Mean 
OLS 2SLS    OLS  2SLS 
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N 562  1147    1577 
 
Notes:  The table reports loser means and OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of ever having used a 
private school scholarship.  Results are from models that control for city, year of application, whether 
applicant had access to a phone, age, type of survey and instrument, strata of residence, and month of 
interview.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Data for the outcome “Finished 8
th” in 
the combined sample does not include applicants to the Bogota 1997 voucher lottery.  For the outcome 
“Test Scores – Total Points,” the sample is restricted to those individuals who took the exam.  In the 
2sls specification, the endogenous regressor used scholarship is instrumented with voucher status.  
Table 8.  Matriculation, Tuition Fees and Voucher Status for Bogota 1995 Applicants 
Full Sample   
 





No Ctls  Basic Ctls    Loser 
Means 
No Ctls  Basic Ctls 
  (1) (2)  (3)    (4) (5)  (6) 
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Currently Using Scholarship 













Sample Size   534  1085  1085    283  661  664 
 
Notes:  The table reports voucher losers’ means and the estimated effect of winning a voucher.  
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations in columns of means and standard errors in columns of 
estimated voucher effects.  Sample sizes differ from other tables because of missing fee data.  The 
sample sizes differ slightly across rows because of missing data for “Currently Using Scholarship from 
the Private School” and the outcomes with the more comprehensive fee measure. The regression 
estimates in columns 3 and 6 are from models that include controls for whether applicants had access 
to a phone, age, type of survey and instrument, strata of residence, and month of interview.  
Table 9.  Lower/Upper Bounds of Voucher Effects on Matriculation and Tuition Fees for 
Bogota 1995 Applicants Who Would Have Attended Private School  






















 (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
190.0 52























































Notes:  The upper bound above a given percentile is computed in a two-step process.  First, we 
estimate the difference between winners’ and losers’ matriculation fees conditional on being greater 
than the given quantile in their respective distributions.  Second, we divide this difference by the 
probability that losers above the given percentile attend private school.  The lower bound above a 
cutoff is computed by differencing winners’ and losers’ fees conditional on private school attendance 
and conditional on being greater than the cutoff.  See text for further details. 
 
 
 